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Securities—Investment Adviser Act—Failure to Disclose Adviser's Posi-
tion in Market with Respect to Stock Recommended to Subscribers.—
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.'—Captain Gains is operated
as a registered investment advisory service under the control of Schwarz-
mann, the sole owner. It published two bulletins: "Facts on Funds" fol-
lowed the changes in the portfolios of mutual funds (not under attack);
"Special Bulletin" analyzed a particular corporation recommended to
subscribers for long term capital investment. The latter publication was
mailed to 5,000 subscribers and occasionally to 100,000 non-subscribers. Seven
bulletins, published between March, 1960 and October, 1960 are the basis of
the SEC complaint: in recommending the purchase of six corporate stocks, 2
Capital Gains failed to disclose that, just prior to recommending them, it
had purchased the stocks; and that, within a few days after mailing the
Bulletin, it sold the same stocks at a profit. Suggesting in a seventh
Bulletin that a stock (Chock Full o'Nuts) was overvalued, Capital Gains
covered a short sale when the market price dropped. Alleging violation of
the antifraud section, 206(1) and (2)," of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940,4
 the SEC sought a preliminary injunction and final injunction enjoining
the use of "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective
client," or "any transaction, practice and course of business which operates as
a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client." The District Court
denied the motion for preliminary injunction;" a panel of the Court of Ap-
peals affirmed. 8 Upon rehearing, the Court of Appeals en banc affirmed
(5-4). HELD: The methods employed by the defendant do not constitute
a scheme or device to defraud clients. It is merely shown that the defendant
profited from its own considered advice.
To appreciate the consequences of the decision in Capital Gains, it is
necessary to examine the legislative history of the Investment Advisers Act,
a new and embryonic being when compared with the ancient contrapuntal
factors of common law deceiti which must now be superimposed upon
security legislation.
The magic date in securities legislation is 1933. Prior to that time,
the ability of the federal government to prosecute fraudulent practices
in the securities field was limited to violations of the mail fraud statute. 8
1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. n 91,166 (2d Cir. July 13, 1962).
2 Continental Insurance, Creole Petroleum, Union Pacific, Hart, Schaffner and
Marx, and United Fruit.
3 It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser registered under § 80b-3 of this
title, by use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce,
directly or indirectly—
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or
prospective client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client.
4 54 Stat. 847 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b (1948), as amended, 74 Stat. 888 (1960),
15 U.S.C. § 80b (1961 Supp.).
5 191 F. Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
300 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1961.).
7 Restatement, Torts, §§ 525-52 (1938).
8 35 Stat. 1130 (1909), 18 U.S.C, 338 (1940), as amended, 62 Stat. 763 (1948),
as recodified, 63 Stat. 94 (1949), 18 U.S.C. 1341 (1958).
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Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act° delineated three offenses specifically
designed to cover the niceties of the flotation of securities. Similar anti-
fraud sections appeared in 1934 legislation." The Investment Advisers Act
resulted from a study by the Commission of investment companies and in-
vestment trusts. In a supplemental report on investment advisersil it was
found that investment counseling had gained impetus as an occupation after
World War L12 Recognizing the • influence of investment advisers' over the
national economy and the existence of abuses in the field," Congress passed
the act on August 22, 1940.
The act encompasses all individuals, partnerships and corporations Which
for compensation engage in the business of advising others as to the value of
securities and the advisibility of investment." Advisers are required to
register with the Securities and Exchange Commission and furnish limited
information about themselves." The term "compulsory census" entered the
0 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1948). Section 17(a) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly—
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary to make the
statement made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
10 Sections 10(b) & 15(c)(1), Securities Exchange Act, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15
U.S.C. §§ 785(b), 780(c) (1) (1948).
H.R. Doc. No. 477, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939), as cited by Loomis, The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 214 (1959).
12 7 Ann. Rep. of the SEC 34 (1941). In 1898 only one investment adviser was
recorded. In 1930 the number had risen to 29. As of June 30, 1961, there were 1855
registrants. 27 Ann. Rep. of the SEC 160 (1961). The Commission and members of
the industry acknowledged that legislation in the field was needed to discourage
persons lacking qualifications from "using a professional status as a cloak to cover up
larceny or any illegal operations." Hearings on S. 3580 Before the Subcommittee of the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. 87 (1940).
13 Loomis, supra note 11, at 244. Among the abuses mentioned were: the fraudulent
activities of "tipster" organizations; possible conflicts of interest;. the existence of
contracts providing for the adviser's compensation on a "heads I win, tails you lose"
basis.
14 Exempted from registration are: newspapers, magazines and financial publications
of general and regular circulation; brokers whose advice is merely incidental to regular
business transaction for which" no special fee is charged; banks, lawyers, accountants,
engineers and teachers whose advisory service is incidental in their professional practice.
7 Ann. Rep. of SEC, supra note 12, at 2940.
15 On initial registration one application was withdrawn at the Commission's
suggestion. The applicant had been in the Wisconsin State Prison since 1930 on a charge
of assault with intent to murder, and was not subject to parole until 1942. Id. at 31.
The Commission may, under § 203(d), deny registration if within ten years prior to
registering the applicant has been enjoined for financial fraud; found to have submitted
a misleading application; or convicted of a crime concerned with a security fraud. See, e.g.,
George C. Crowder, 8 SEC Dec. and Rep. 947 (1941).
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lexicon of administrative jargon." Although section 80b-17 makes willful
violation of the act a felony,' 7 license revocations and injunctions have
been the Commission's customary enforcement techniques."
That there have been few cases under the act appears attributable not
so much to a well-regulated industry as to the deficiencies of the act. The
1942 Annual Report of the SEC noted the absence of power to make periodic
checks of the accounts and records of the registrants as they were empowered
to do under Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act. "This omission leaves
entirely unsupervised and unprotected a broad field in the handling of in-
vestment funds of the general public.'" Despite frequent urging by the
SEC2° it was not until 1960 that amendments were passed,"] making it
unlawful for registrants to engage in fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative
procedures; the Commission was directed to set up rules to this end.
The common law concepts of deceit22 present a difficult if not in-
surmountable context for the statutory fraud measures of the legislation
in question. 23
 The courts have recognized that the "intricate merchandise 24
involved necessitated protection for the unsophisticated investor; 25
 "the fact
is that the courts have repeatedly said that the fraud provisions in the SEC
acts, as well as the mail fraud statute, are not limited to circumstances which
would give rise to a common law action for deceit." 26
16
 Hearing on S. 3580 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. Part 1 at 48 (1940).
17 United States v. Hageman, Litig. Rels. 670, 789, 791 (S,D.N.Y. 1953).
18
 Injuctions were granted in SEC v. Dyer, Inv. Adv. Act Rel. No. 28 (Denver,
Colo. 1942) (defendant purported to use a "unique scientific formula"); SEC v. Lubbe,
Litig. Rel. 72 (S.D. Ill. 1943) ; SEC v. Greenamn, Litig. Rel. 977, 982 (D. Utah 1956)
(defendant speculated in worthless uranium stock); SEC v. Henry Heiser & Co., Litig.
Rel. 878, 915, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 1955, 1957) (defendants could have been enjoined but
were allowed a stay to mend their ways which was not done, final injunction being
entered Mar. 22, 1957). In People v. Goldsmith, 86 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1948), defendant
represented to the public that he had a special system. He failed to disclose that this
was the analysis of comic strips. He had "learned" the code during a seance with a
departed securities speculator.
19 8 Ann. Rep. of SEC 36 (1942).
20 15 Ann. Rep. of SEC 160 (1949). "The Commission has received a substantial
number of complaints against certain investment advisers whose advice consists
chiefly of predictions and recommendation furnished in bulletins, market letters, and
other publications issued periodically and sold at a regular subscription price. The
number of complaints generally increase . . . as the market declines. Because of these
limitations [of inadequate powers of inspection] . . . a broad field intimately related
to the securities market is left unprotected and unsupervised, and the Commission's
efforts to enforce the act are greatly curtailed." 22 Ann. Rep. of SEC 193 (1956).
21 74 Stat. 887 (1960), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b (1961 Supp.). See generally 2 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 3502-11 (1960).
22 Prosser, Torts 523 (2d ed. 1955). Proof of a (1) false representation of a
(2) material (3) fact; (4) the defendant must make it to induce reliance; (5) the
plaintiff must rely on the false representation; and (6) suffer damage as a consequence.
23 3 Loss, Securities Regulations 1430-44 (2d ed. 1961) ; Shulman, Civil Liability
and the Securities Act, 43 Yale L.]. 227 (1933).
24 H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1938).
26 Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 786 (1944); Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795, 803 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 319
U.S. 767 (1943).
26 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1435 n.19 citing cases.
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The leading case of Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC-27 is illustrative of the
traditional position. In referring to the fraud aspects of the broker's conduct,
Judge Clark remarked:
We need not stop to decide, however, how far common law fraud
was shown. For the business of selling investment securities has
been one peculiarly in need of regulation for the protection of the
investor. 28
This contention was reiterated in Norris & Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC29 in 1949.
In the Arleen Hughes case, 3° defendant, registered as both a broker-dealer
and as an investment adviser, did not inform clients of her adverse interest
in the market. The court acknowledged that the securities field, "by its very
nature, requires specialized and unique legal treatment. This is recognized
by the very statutes and regulations here under consideration as well as by
recent federal and state court decisions."3 ' Emphasis was given to the point
that proof of loss, one of the common law deceit requirements, is not a con-
sideration under the 1933 Securities Act. Revocation of her license as a
broker-dealer was proper if one or none of her clients suffered injtiry. 32
These decisions reflect the courts' recognition of the need, which the Second
Circuit appears to have overlooked, for effective regulation in the security
field and, in addition, that the common law concepts of deceit should not
confine the needed effectiveness. In Capital Gains the court retreats from this
position. (In commenting on the case before the rehearing, Professor Loss
states, "The SEC suffered a defeat, whose dimensions are not altogether
clear. . . .") 33
The majority opinion in Capital Gains cites SEC v. Torr." with ap-
proval.33 That this case does not support their conclusion is correctly noted
by the dissent of Judge Clark. In Tarr, stock was touted to customers and the
defendants were secretly compensated. The stock was of a reputable firm and
no misrepresentations were made. However, no disclosure was made of the
plan to create trading in the recommended stock. "In principle there is no
difference between the method of recommendation pursued here and the
hired employment of a tipster sheet that purports to give impartial informa-
27 Supra note 25.
28 Id. at 437.
29 177 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
38 Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
31 Id. at 975.
32 Accord, SEC v. Torr, 15 F. Supp. 315, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1936), rev'd on other
grounds, 87 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1937).
33 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 23, at 11 (1962 Supp.). See also Note, 75 Harv. L.
Rev. 1450 n.6 (1962); Note, 71 Yale L.J. 1342, 1347 (1962).
An example of activity enjoined under §§ 206(1) and (2) of the act under present
consideration is provided by Seipel v. SEC, 228 F.2d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1955). In a
per curiam opinion, the court enjoined defendant's practice of representing to persons
answering his ads that he guaranteed against loss and maintained extensive offices with
a foreign exchange department. He alleged he had had 25 years trading experience and
many clients. In fact he had no office, associates, organization or customers.
34 Supra note 32.
38 Supra note 1, g 93,821.
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tion."36
 It is submitted that the facts of the instant case differ only slightly.
Nevertheless, it is to be noted that in the foregoing cases, with the
exception of Seipe/, 37
 the courts were dealing with brokers and not with
investment advisers.
The crux of the decision in the instant case centers on the characterization
of Capital Gains Research Bureau. Although official pronouncements of the
Commission have dealt specifically with the situation of an investment adviser
acting also as a principal for a client pursuant to section 206(3), his
capacity has been regarded as that of a fiduciary." That this should be his
status cannot be doubted if the remedial purposes of the legislation are to be
realized. Peculiarly, the majority opinion concedes this point; it notes that
federal securities laws, in light of their objectives, should be broadly construed.
It is therefore difficult to follow the reasoning of the court when it thus
premises its decision but ultimately retreats into a narrow interpretation of
section 206(1) and (2) in terms of technical fraud.
Precedent for the majority position may be found in SEC v. Todd" or
in Hughes v. SEC.° The stated rationale for their statutory interpretation of
the act lies in its legislative history: it was not as comprehensive as its
forerunners; subsequent legislation has been needed to round out its piece-
meal measures; the antifraud section is "deliberately meagre." The new
paragraph added in 1960, 206(4), makes it unlawful for advisers to pursue
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative practices. The Commission. has been
directed to define such practices and set out rules to prevent them. 4 ' The
strongest language in support of the majority opinion is in the Senate report:
"This provision would enable the Commission to deal adequately with such
problems as a material adverse interest in securities which the adviser is
recommending to his clients." 42
 However, it may be questioned if this
language should be the basis of cutting down the force of section 206(1) and
(2). Rules promulgated after the sharp practice is discovered cannot be
said to be the entire answer. Indeed, even if the foregoing be accepted, the
wisdom of the majority contention that fraud must be defined by the
Commission remains a question of serious doubt. 43
36
 Id. at 317.
37 Seipel v. SEC, supra note 33.
38
 Opinion of the Trading and Ex. Div. of SEC, Rel. No. 40, Feb. 5, 1945.
39
 Litig. Rel. 372, 15 Ann. Rep. of SEC 161 (D. Mass. 1946, 1948). Action was
dismissed after a showing that the provable facts would not support a conviction.
4o Supra note 31, at 977. "Our entire opinion concerns itself only with the revoca-
tion of petitioner's broker -dealer registration. There is nothing in the record before us
which in any way attacks her investment adviser registration, which registration, we
presume, is still in full force and effect." (emphasis original) But cf. 3 Loss, op. cit. supra
note 23, at 1515 n.118 which states that this result could not occur under the 1960
amendment.
41 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 23 (1962 Supp. at 13-14) ; 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News, supra note 21, at 3504.
42 S. Rep. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1960).
43 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1436. "The courts have traditionally refused,
whether at common law deceit or under security laws, to define fraud with specificity."
Loss cites the Oregon court's pronouncement in State v. Whiteaker, 118 Ore. 656, 661,
247 Pac. 1077, 1079 (1926), that to do so would create "a certain class of gentlemen of
the 'J. Rufus Wallingford' type—`they toil not neither do they spin'—who would
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It is submitted that the dissent, led by Judge Clark, presents the prefer-
able view. The Investment Advisers Act should not be given a poor relative
standing, but should be construed with its predecessors mutatis mutandis."
The case reinstates all the former uncertainty as to the meaning of anti-
fraud sections of securities legislation with an apologia of "everybody wins
all around." Cited as the "worst feature" by the minority is that indulgence
instead of opprobrium should be given to the scalping practice utilized by
those with a low standard of business practice. Appropriate to this position
is the oft-quoted passage from Archer v. SEC: 45
The business of trading in securities is one in which opportuni-
ties for dishonesty are of constant recurrence and ever present. It
engages acute, active minds, trained to quick apprehension, decision
and action. The Congress has seen fit to regulate this business.
Though such regulation must be done in strict subordination to
Constitutional and lawful safeguards of individual rights, it is to be
enforced notwithstanding the frauds to be suppressed may take on
more subtle and involved forms than those in which dishonesty
manifests itself in cruder and less specialized activities.
JERRY FITZGERALD ENGLISH
Contributor
Taxation—Use of Cash in Type B Reorganization.—Turnbow v. Com-
missioner. 1.—Petitioner owned all of the 5,000 shares of outstanding stock
in the International Dairy Supply Co., which shares he transferred in 1952
to Foremost Dairy Company. He received in exchange 82,375 shares (a
minor percentage) of Foremost's common (voting) stock of a fair market
value of $1,235,625, plus a boot in the amount of $3,000,000. The gain
realized by the taxpayer on the exchange—i.e., stock and cash in excess of
the basis of his own stock and expenses—was $4,163,691.94. 2
lie awake nights endeavoring to conceive some devious and shadowy way of evading the
law. It is more advisable to deal with each case as it arises."
44 3 Loss, op, cit. supra note 23, at 1515.
45 133 F.2d 795, 803 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 767 (1943).
1 368 U.S. 337 (1961).
2 The following is the statutory complex from which the Turnbow and Howard
issues arise.
Int. Rev. Code of 1939:
§ 112(b) (3) . . . No gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or securities
in a corporation a party to a reorganization are, in pursuance of the plan of
reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities in such corporation or
in another corporation a party to the reorganization.
§ 112(c) (1) . . . provides further, "if an exchange would have qualified
under § 112(b) (3) but for the receipt of cash or property (boot) other than
the permissible stock or securities, then the gain will not be recognized in full
but will be recognized only in an amount not in excess of the boot."
§ 112(g) (1) (B) ... by definition the term "reorganization" means "the
acquisition by one corporation in exchange solely for all or a. part of its voting
stock, of at least 80 percentum -of the stock of another corporation."
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